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Introduction 
This paper examines the extent to which the American states spend 
LEAA ( Law Enforcement Assistance Administration) block grants in 
response to growing crime rates and/or the public's desire to halt the 
increasing number of criminal violations. Our principal concern is 
whether or not states , as block grant recipients , are allocating this 
federal aid in a way that could be characterized as responsive to either 
public opinion or the targeted problem, i.e., crime. 
The federal government established the Law Enforcement As-
sistance Administration block grant program under Title I of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ( Public Law 
90-351 ) .1 This law, to a great extent, was a response to the public 
concern with crime manifested in the late 1960's. Not only were citizens 
inundated with rhetoric by the FBI and others indicating such occur-
rences were increasing , but the civil disorders of 1967 and 1968, as well 
as the assassinations of President John Kennedy, Senator Robert Ken-
nedy, and Dr. Martin Luther King, caused many people to fear for their 
personal safety, even in localities where evidence indicated persons were 
only rarely the victims of violent acts.2 Thus, it is not too surprising that 
in 1968 crime was viewed by Americans as being the number one 
domestic problem . 3 This public attitude is credited with having sig-
nificant political consequences, including its effect upon the outcome 
of several elections, such as the 1968 presidential contest. 4 
0 We wish to thank Harvey Marshall for his helpful comments on the meth-
odology employed in this paper. 
1 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Statutes atl Large, Vol 
82 (1968), pp. 191-209; 
2 Fred P. Graham, "A Contemporary History of American Crime," in Hugh 
Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, The Historfj of Violence in America (New 
York: Bantam Books, 1969), pp. 495-496. 
8 American Institute for Public Opinion, The Gallup Poll-1935-1971 (New 
York: Random House, 1972), p. 2107. 
4 Richard Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg , The Real ,Majority (New York: 
Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, Inc., 1970). 
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Evidence indicates the fears of individuals were not merely the re-
sult of proclamations made by J. Edgar Hoover and several candidates 
for elective office, however. The level of violent crimes began increasing 
drastically, especially robbery which nearly always involves a confronta-
tion between persons not known to each other , and includes the threat 
of bodily harm, if not the actual use of force. Moreover, the number 
of persons being injured during robberies has also grown. In short, the 
fear of being victimized not only is greater than it was 10 or 15 years 
ago, the probability of becoming a crime statistic also is higher than in 
the past, particularly in major metropolitan areas. 5 
Under the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration program , 
money is apportioned among the states on a per capita basis for the 
general purpose of alleviating crime by improving the processes of 
criminal justice. 6 States are to spend their grants for individual projects 
intended to improve the effectiveness of various criminal justice agencies. 
In order to qualify for these monies, a state must establish a state 
planning agency (SPA) under the control of the governor. States receive 
each year's grant when the LEAA approves the comprehensive plan 
which has been prepared and adopted by that agency. This unit then is 
authorized to make "subgrants" to state and local law enforcement 
agencies.7 
5 Graham, op. cit., 502-504; and Marvin Wolfgang, "Urban Crime," in James 
Q. Wilson, The Metropolitan Enigma (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 
1970), pp. 292-296. 
6 Statutes at Large, op. cit., 197-199. For a discussion of the regulations govern-
ing the operation of this block grant program see Edward J. Clynch, Law Enf01Ce-
ment Assistance Administration Bwck Grants: A Policy Analysis ( unpublished Ph .D. 
dissertation, Purdue University, 1974), chapter 2. The law establishes block grants: 
one for planning purposes ( planning grants ) and one for funding criminal justice 
projects ( action grants). This work deals exclusively with the action grants and all 
references to block grants refer to this type of allocation. 
7 Clnych, op. cit., Statutes at Large, op. cit. The requirement that subgrants be 
awarded on the basis of a comprehensive plan, approved by the LEAA, gives federal 
administrators some potential control over how these resources are utilized. LEAA offi-
cials, however, have imposed very few programmatic controls on state planning 
agencies. States are free to determine how block grants are divided among different 
parts of the criminal justice system, provided some resources are channeled to each 
segment. LEAA oversight is mostly concerned with operating procedur es rather than 
substantive spending decisions. However, the federal agency does monitor state 
spending to insure funds are utilized in accordance with the comprehensive plan 
developed by the SPA. In essence, states may decide how they wish to distribute 
block grant resources, but a plan must be submitted to the LEAA and accepted by 
that agency. Furthermore, actual spending is expected to be guided by this document. 
The existence of regional planning units ( RPU) within each state also raises 
questions about the state being the appropriate unit of analysis. To date , SPA willing-
ness to accept RPU spending recommendations without alteration has not been 
clarified by a comprehensive cross-state analysis. Studies of individual or a few 
states seem to indicate that the decision-making role of RPU's varies. In any case, 
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LEAA block grants provide states not only with money, but also 
with the flexibility to fund projects intended to alleviate criminal ac-
tivity of concern to their citizens. This research, it should be empha-
sized, does not evaluate the impact of block grant spending on the 
incidence of crime. Rather, it assesses whether or not allocation de-
cisions are based on public sentiment and/ or crime rates, the available 
measure of the targeted problem. 
Dependent Variables 
Statewide expenditure data are the measures of policy output 
utilized in this study. The LEAA requires states to classify expenditures 
by a number of functional categories. From these data we have selected 
two specific indicators for inclusion as dependent variables in our 
analysis: ( 1) the percentage of LEAA funds spent on crime prevention, 
and ( 2) the proportion of this aid allocated for detection and appre-
hension of alleged criminals. We have chosen these indicators because 
they primarily represent spending for projects intended to reduce crime 
through improving police effectiveness. Crime increases could lead to 
states favoring projects for any of the parts of law enforcement, but we 
believe an important question to be answered is whether or not the 
level of support for police-related undertakings are affected by the 
targeted problems. The police, among all segments of the criminal 
justice system, are ". . . viewed as the prime actors for reducing 
crime ... " 8 Demands for more "law and order," moreover, usually 
it appears that the state remains a relevant actor. All projects funded must have the 
approval of the state planning agency. This unit must, at a minimum, co-ordinate 
RPU spending requests on the basis of the state's plan. See Law and Disorder III, 
(Washington, D. C.: Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, April 1972), 
pp. 13-15; U. S. Congress, House, Block Grant Programs of the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration, 92nd Congress, 2nd sess., 1972, pp. 48-60; and Malcolm 
Feeley, Austin Sarat and Susan White, "Implementation of the Safe Streets Act: 
The Role of State Planning in the Development of Criminal Justice Federalism, paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 
Chicago, Illinois, May 1976, pp. 14-15. 
8 Police anti-crime task forces, for example, have been established with the 
objective of deterring potential offenders from committing violations of the law. In 
addition, projects are being financed with LEAA resources to eliminate obvious 
opportunities for infractions, such as efforts to upgrade street lighting in high crime 
areas. The police are also introducing programs intended to encourage individuals 
to take steps having the likelihood of reducing the chances of an illegal entry. Door-
to-door inspections of homes and businesses are conducted by trained officers and 
campaigns are being undertaken to encourage persons to mark their possessions with 
an identification number which is registered with law enforcement officials. See 
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, A National, 
Strategy to Reduce Crime (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of Justice, 1973), 
pp. 94-96 and 108; and John McKay of the National League of Cities, private 
interview with Edward J. Clynch, February 25, 1975. 
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are accompanied by hard-line solutions such as increasing the ability 
of the police to detect and apprehend criminals. 
These categories, at the same time, involve two very different 
strategies for reducing crime through police actions. Items included 
under crime prevention are "proactive," referring to steps taken to mini-
mize the likelihood of illegal acts ever occurring. Detection and appre-
hension expenditures, by comparison, reflect a "reactive" approach to 
"crime in the streets." Here the focus is upon reducing the incidence of 
illegal activities by increasing police effectiveness in arresting individ-
uals, who may have committed a crime. By incorporating both types of 
measures in our analysis, we should be able to assess policy responses 
which have been "proactive" or "reactive" in nature. The total number 
of states included in the present research is 43, since seven states did 
not report their expenditures on the form suggested by the LEAA.9 
The data employed were for the year 1970, the first year a substantial 
amount of federal money was transferred to the states under this pro-
gram.10 Most of the 1970 allocation was completely expended at the 
time these data were gathered. 11 
Independent Variables 
The notion of responsiveness will be conceptualized in two different 
ways as indicated in the introductory section. First, we may impart an 
interpretation derived from democratic philosophy. That is to say, states 
implementing policies consistent with public opinion can be labelled 
"responsive." Congruence with mass preferences, then, becomes the 
relevant assessment criterion. Second, states and local communities can 
respond to the specific policy problems under consideration, rather than 
what the citizenry believe is an appropriate course of action. In this 
instance, policies would be determined directly by the increases in 
criminal activity, and not by public opinion. 
We encounter significant difficulty in attempting to operationalize 
our first definition of responsiveness. Essentially, we must construct in-
dices of mass preferences regarding responses to increased crime in 
9 During 1970, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and 
Wyoming did not use the budgetary form suggested by the LEAA. Therefore our 
analysis was performed on an N of 43. 
10 The dollar amounts of federal money allocated during the first three years of 
the program are as follows: 1969-$24 million; 1970-$183 million; and 197,1-$340 
million. See Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 5th Annual RepOf't, 
(Washington, D. C.: Department of Justice, May 1973), p. 2. 
11 At the time the data were collected in May 1973, the average proportion of 
the LEAA funds which had been spent by the states was 98.6 percent for 1969; 
90.9 percent for 1970; and 70.4 percent for 1971. 
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the streets. More precisely, we would like to know how the public 
would wish to see the LEAA funds distributed across the functional 
categories of expenditure. Regrettably , we do not have state-by-state 
public opinion polls accurately measuring the policy preferences of the 
citizenry with respect to this block grant program. 
We can calculate, however, a very general, crude indicator of public 
attitude regarding the "law and order " problem by a computer simulation 
methodology developed by the M.I.T. Simulmatics Project, 12 and elab-
orated upon by Ronald E. Weber. 13 This technique allows the researcher 
to translate national survey results into state-by-state estimates of the 
preferences of eligible electorates. 14 For any item included in a national 
opinion poll , one can compute the distribution of attitudes for each 
state, even though representative samples were not drawn for all states 
included in the analysis. 
We, therefore, can estimate the extent to which there is a general 
belief or desire to increase police protection in order to deal with "crime 
in the streets." To do so, we relied upon the following question which 
appeared on a Gallup Poll administered in 1968: 
In recent years there has been a sharp increase in the nation's crime 
rate. What steps do you think should be taken to reduce crime? 1~ 
This was an open-ended question , permitting a myriad of responses. 
Consequently, we selected the type of answer which expressed a prefer-
ence for "more law enforcement ," "more police," "more police protection," 
"more power for the police," or "less restrictions on the police" as most 
reflective of the public's desire to do something about crime in the streets, 
the very purpose for which the LEAA block grant system was instituted. 
The percentage of each state 's eligible electorate who felt the answer 
to mounting street crimes was an increase in police protection and law 
12 See Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert P. Abelson and Samuel Popkin, Candidates, 
Issues, & Strategies: A Computer Simulation of the 1960 and 1964 Presidential 
Elections (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 196.5). 
13 See Ronald E . Weber, Public Policy Preferences in the States (Bloomington, 
Indiana: Indiana University Institute of Public Adininistration, 1971); and Ronald 
E . Weber . Anne H. Hopkins, Michael L. Mezey and Frank J. Munger, "Computer 
Simulation of State Electorates ," Public Opinion Quarterly, 36 (Winter, 1972-73) , 
pp. 549-565. 
14 This methodology generates estimates of statewide opinion on the basis of 
national survey data by ( 1) using an additive model to compute the attitudes of 
regional voter-types, ( 2) attributing the regional voter-type preferences to the voter-
types in each state within the region, ( 3) multiplying the attributed opinion to the 
frequency of the voter-type in each state, and ( 4) calculating a weighted average 
of the products over all voter-types in each state. 
111 AIPO 757, January 30, 1968. 
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enforcement is estimated by subjecting this survey item to the simulation 
methodology cited above. 
The second notion of responsiveness focuses upon the ability to 
devote money and effort to the problem, namely crime in the streets, 
rather than public opinion regarding the allocation of funds. The utiliza-
tion of the LEAA block grants may indicate the extent to which · states 
are responding directly to the growth in criminal infractions. 
The measure of crime for this study is a factor score which reHects 
changes in robbery during the 1965 to 1968 period. 16 We are hypothe-
sizing that policy outputs would most likely be linked to increases in 
violations, rather than levels of recorded offenses, since the growing 
crime rate prompted the LEAA block grant program. An indicator re-
Hecting increases in robbery has been selected because this is the 
stranger-related offense causing the most concern about "crime in the 
streets." 17 Increases in this infraction, almost always involving a confron-
tation between a victim and an unknown assailant, are viewed as being 
responsible for much of the fear about crime expressed by many citizens. 
In short , although the monetary loss to society from these actions is only 
a small fraction of the total cost of crime, the psychic damage created 
by these acts appears to be substantial. 18 
In order to assess the impact of increases in crime and public opinion 
upon LEAA expenditures, we shall apply path analysis to the model 
depicted in Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1 
Simple Path Model 
16 This indicator has been created by the factor analysis of a number of crime 
statistics. See Clynch. op. cit., pp. 109-119. The use of crime statistics as a measure 
of criminal activity is the subject of continuing controversy. However, if officials 
are going to spend LEAA resources in response to crime, crime statistics are the 
only hard measure of these happenings at their disposal. For a discussion of the use 
of crime statistics in social science research see Wesley G. Skogan, "The Validity 
of Official Crime Statistics: An Empirical Investigation," Social Science Quarterly, 
55 (June, 1974). 
17 A National Strategy to Reduce Crime, op. cit., pp. 7-8. 
18 Ibid., pp. 8-11. 
38 JoUR.~AL OF PouncAL ScIENCE 
In the ensuing analysis, we shall partition the impact of crime in-
crease into its direct and indirect effects. For public opinion we shall 
compute both direct and spurious effects. In both cases, the direct effects 
are equivalent to the path coefficients or beta weights. 
Furthermore, we anticipate certain environmental or political factors 
to foster or impede responsiveness in the expenditure of LEAA funds. 
For example, the extent to which a state is heterogeneous with respect 
to community size and income ("Development Heterogeneity") might 
encourage greater sensitivity to increased crime rates and public demand 
for solutions. 19 Likewise , a political factor which may be of special 
significance is the degree of innovativeness of a state. Presumably, more 
innovative systems can respond more readily to a newly-emerging or 
rapidly growing problem. 2° Finally, states which are highly professional-
ized and locally reliant may be able to react more directly to greater 
criminal activity and public opinion. 21 
To assess the effects of these socioeconomic and political variables, 
we shall compute path model results, while controlling for a social or 
political factor. For example, the model will be evaluated for above 
average development heterogeneity states, and then for below average 
development heterogeneity states. The same approach will be utilized 
for the political system variables. 
Findings 
The results for the path models employing crime prevention ex-
penditures as the dependent variable are reported in Table 1. Clearly, 
for all 43 states included in the analysis, the increase in robbery does 
have a moderate direct effect upon crime prevention expenditures. How-
ever, virtually no indirect effects emerge, even though robbery increases 
appear to produce a greater public desire for more police protection. 
The opinion variable has a non-significant path coefficient which is, 
nevertheless, in the expected direction. 
19 This socioeconomic characteristic is measured by a factor score labelled "De-
velopment Heterogeneity. " For an explanation of the factor score, see Eric M. 
Uslaner and Ronald E. Weber, "The 'Politics' of Redistribution: Towards a Model 
of the Policy-Making Process in the American States," American PoUtics Quarterly, 
Vol. 3, (April 1975), pp. 142 and 169. 
20 We shall utilize Walker's innovation score. For a complete discussion of the 
index, see Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations Among the Amei:;can 
States," American Political Science Review, 63 ( September 1969 ), pp. 882-883. 
21 For a description of the profe ssionalism-local reliance measure we have em-
ployed in this study, see Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert, "Dimensions of 
State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy" American Political Science Review, 
63 (September, 1969), pp. 867-879. 
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TABLE I 
Path Analyses for Responsiveness Models With 
Crime Prevention Expenditures as Dependent Variable 
( Socio-Economic or Political System Control) 
Crime 
Robbery Increases E.iects to Public Opinion E.iects 
Controls• Total Direct Indirect 
Opinion 
Path Total Direct Spurious 
All States ( 43) . . . . . . . . .438 .352 .086 .348 .370 .247 .123 
High Development 
.. . 528 .397 Heterogeneity ( 26) .131 .419 .479 .313 .166 
Low Development 
Heterogeneity ( 17) .. . 202 .190 .012 .086 .158 .142 .016 
High Innovation (21) .373 .343 .030 .114 .300 .261 .039 
Low Innovation ( 22) .327 .323 .004 .414 .144 .010 .134 
High Professionalism-
Low Reliance (19) . .622 .473 .149 .508 .533 .293 .240 
Low Professionalism-
Local Reliance ( 24) .. .160 .140 .020 .127 .172 .154 .018 
• Number of states in parentheses . 
TABLE 2 
Path Analyses for Responsiveness Models With 
Detection/ Apprehension Expenditures as Dependent Variable 
( Socio-Economic or Political System Controls) 
Crime 
Robbery Increases E.iects to Public Opinion E.iects 
Opinion 
Controls 0 Total Direct Indirect Path Total Direct Spurious 
All States ( 43) .089 .045 .046 .348 .140 .124 .016 
High Development 
Heterogeneity ( 26) .. . 099 .052 .047 .419 .132 .110 .022 
Low Development 
Heterogen eity ( 17) .344 .327 .017 .086 .232 .202 .029 
High Innovation ( 21 ) .. . 022 .011 .011 .114 .100 .099 .001 
Low Innovation ( 22) .. . 267 .174 .093 .414 .297 .225 .072 
High Professionalism-
Local Reliance ( 19) .. 
Low Professionalism-
.060 - .096 .156 .508 .258 .307 - .049 
0 Number of states in par entheses . 
Turn ing to the path models with controls employed , we find that in 
above average development heterogeneity states the proportion of LEAA 
funds devoted to crime prevention seems to be spent in direct response to 
robbery increases. Again, public opinion has a non-significant, but posi-
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tive impact. By way of contrast, neither of the independent variables has 
a bearing upon crime prevention expenditures in low development 
heterogeneity states. Perhaps states which are less diverse with respect 
to community size and income do not have highly developed police 
departments which can focus more of their attention and money on 
preventive measures. As a result , no systematic response to increased 
robbery is forthcoming. 
Although controls for innovativeness yield no significant effects for 
either growing crime rates or public opinion , in high professionalism-
local reliance states, the amount of funds allocated for crime prevention 
measures is substantially determined by increases in robbery. P~rhaps the 
more professionalized and locally reliant environments have the cap-
abilities , expertise and skills to identify and react to problems con-
fronting decision-makers. 
Even a cursory inspection of Table 2 will indicate that the per-
centage of a state's LEAA funds devoted to detection and apprehension 
is responsive to neither increases in robbery nor the desire for more 
protection by the public. Clearly, decision-makers are responding to 
different cues when they allocate LEAA money for this type of police 
activity. 
Summary and Conclusion 
In general, we have found that increased robbery leads to greater 
proportions of LEAA money being allocated for crime prevention, but 
not for detection and apprehension. However, soaring crime rates do 
not indirectly determine either category of expenditure through public 
opinion. Overall, increased criminal activity has had a bearing upon the 
preferences of the citizenry, but these views, in turn, do not appear to 
have a direct effect on LEAA expenditures. 
In a limited way , the path models computed with controls for 
selected socioeconomic and political factors may have some relevance 
for this area of public policy. We have observed for crime prevention 
activities that both high development heterogeneity and above average 
professionalism -local reliance states are quite responsive when allocating 
LEAA funds. From a pragmatic standpoint , the social and economic 
characteristics are not easily manipulated , but the degree of professional-
ization may be more readily controlled. Thus , if responsiveness is a 
high priority in criminal justice programs, then we would contend that 
states ought to seek to maximize professionalism and local initiative in 
the policy-making process. 
